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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY
EROL, Selman
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
June 2009
In this thesis, we investigate several issues concerning the class of Maskin
monotonic social choice rules. Firstly, given a set of profiles, we find out which
Maskin monotonic social choice rules adopt this set as a center. Then we in-
troduce an algorithmic approach to find the self-monotonicities of a Maskin
monotonic social choice rule. Moreover, we characterize all binary set opera-
tions that preserve Maskin monotonicity. Then we pass to investigating social
choice functions, and determine the the domains of impossibility and possibil-
ity around a center with respect to a modified Manhattan metric. Finally, we
try to reach a necessary and sufficient condition for Nash-implementability of
a social choice in terms of neutrality.
Keywords: Social Choice Theory, Maskin Monotonicity, Nash Implementa-
tion, Center, Self Monotonicity, Manhattan Metric, Impossibility, Preserva-
tion of Maskin Monotonicity, Neutrality.
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O¨ZET
SOSYAL SEC¸MEDE MAKALELER
EROL, Selman
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Haziran 2009
Bu tez c¸alıs¸mamızda, Maskin tekdu¨ze sosyal sec¸me kurallarının sınıfının c¸es¸itli
o¨zelliklerini inceliyoruz. I˙lk olarak, tercih profillerinden olus¸an bir ku¨menin
hangi Maskin tekdu¨ze sosyal sec¸me kuralları tarafından merkez olarak kabul
edildig˜ini buluyoruz. Daha sonra Maskin tekdu¨ze bir sosyal sec¸me kuralının
o¨z tekdu¨zeliklerini bulan bir algoritma sunuyoruz. Ayrıca, Maskin mono-
tonlug˜u koruyan tu¨m ku¨me is¸lemlerinin karakterizasyonunu yapıyoruz. Daha
sonra sosyal sec¸me fonksiyonlarını inceliyoruz ve modifiye edilmis¸ Manhat-
tan o¨lc¸u¨tu¨ne go¨re bir merkez etrafındaki tanım bo¨lgelerinin imkansızlık veya
imkanlılık bo¨lgeleri olup olmadıg˜ını belirliyoruz. Son olarak, bir sosyal sec¸me
kuralının Nash-uygulanabilirlig˜i ic¸in no¨trallik cinsinden gerekli ve yeterli bir
kos¸ul bulmaya c¸alıs¸ıyoruz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Sec¸im, Nash Uygulanabilirlik, Maskin Tekdu¨zelik,
Merkez, O¨z Tekdu¨zelik, Manhattan O¨lc¸u¨tu¨, I˙mkansızlık, Maskin Tekdu¨zelig˜in
Korunurlug˜u, No¨trallik.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this thesis, we investigate several issues concerning Maskin monotonic
social choice rules and social choice functions. Mainly we are looking for the
underlying structure of Maskin monotonic social choice rules.
Given that a social choice rule is Maskin monotonic, rather than the total
set of preference profiles, a subset of profiles is sufficient to tell the outcomes
of the rule throughout the whole domain. The idea results from the notion
of a critical profile originating from the work of Koray, Adali, Erol, and
Ordulu (2001). Afterwards, Koray and Dogan (2008) introduce the notion
of a center, intuitively defined as the smallest set of profiles that is sufficient
to characterize the rule. In its formal definition, center is a subset of profiles
and it does not provide the information about the outcomes at these profiles.
Therefore a natural question arises; which social choice rules have the same
center? Having the same center is a classification about social choice rules
and may shed further light to the structure of the class of Maskin monotonic
social choice rules. The answer is sought in chapter 3.
In chapter 4, we delve deeper into the notion of monotonicity. Maskin
monotonicity, as the name tells, is a kind of monotonicity, which is one
among many. Koray (2002) introduces monotonicity for social choice rules,
and it becomes possible to compare social choice rules with respect to their
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monotonicities, allowing us to answer what degree of monotonicity a social
choice rule has (Koray and Dogan 2008). Smallest monotonicities of a so-
cial choice rule is called a self monotonicity, which is proven to be related
to Nash-implementability of the rule, by Koray and Dogan (2008). With
their approach, it becomes easier to check whether a social choice rule is
Nash-implementable, and with this chapter it becomes easier to find the self
monotonicities of the rule with an algorithmic approach.
Considering Maskin monotonic social choice rules individually, monotonic-
ities tell us a lot. However, the underlying structure of the class of Maskin
monotonic social choice rules is not investigated in detail. The chapters con-
cerning the center and self monotonicity turns out to be telling about this
structure. Furthermore, this class could be analyzed from an algebraic point
of view. It is clear that under union or intersection, Maskin monotonicity is
preserved. Then we may talk of the largest Maskin monotonic subcorrespon-
dence of any social choice rule. Delving deeper into the topic in chapter 5, we
try to find all set operations that preserve Maskin monotonicity. Therefore
we may talk of various algebraic operations causing partial orders on Maskin
monotonic social choice rules allowing for maximal elements and equivalence
classes.
In chapter 6, we focus our attention to Mueller-Satterthwaite theorem and
the impossibility result. Under full domain and at least three alternatives,
it is impossible to find an onto, Maskin monotonic, and non-dictatorial so-
cial choice function. Koray and Gurer (2008) give conditions in terms of the
domain of the function using Manhattan metric, so that we can get rid of
the impossibility result. We modify Manhattan metric to investigate the key
element of impossibility by giving different weights to transpositions. More-
over, it turns out that there may occur nested domains of impossibility and
possibility. We mainly employ the idea in the proof of Mueller-Satterthwaite
theorem provided by Koray, Adali, Erol, and Ordulu (2001).
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Lastly in chapter 7, we look for conditions necessary and sufficient for
Nash-implementability of Maskin monotonic social choice rules in terms of
neutrality. Due to Maskin (1977) and Moore and Repullo (1990), it is well
known that a form of monotonic behavior of the social choice rule and the as-
sumption that individuals’ veto powers are limited are the key factors in Nash-
implementability. It has been proven by Maskin (1977) that Ne-Veto-Power
and Maskin monotonicity are sufficient conditions whereas Maskin mono-
tonicity is a necessary condition. Then it is natural to narrow the conditions
to arrive at a necessary and sufficient condition, which is indeed achieved by
Moore and Repullo (1990), by weaking Ne-Veto-Power and tolerating it with
strengthening Maskin monotonicity and assuming a form unanimity. How-
ever, we know that neutrality and Maskin monotonicity is also a set of nec-
essary conditions for Nash-implementability. We try to weaken neutrality in
order to obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash-implementability
in terms neutrality, or at least try to find an appropriate approach in doing
so.
3
CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout the thesis, A will denote the finite set of alternatives and N will
denote the finite set of individuals. A linear order is a transitive, antisym-
metric, and complete binary relation. L(A) is the set of all linear orders on
A. An element of L(A)N will be called a preference profile. A social choice
function (SCF) is a function F : L(A)N → A and a social choice rule (SCR) is
a function F : L(A)N → 2A. For any a ∈ A and P ∈ L(A) the lower contour
set of a at P is L(a, P ) := {b ∈ A : aPb} and the strict lower contour set of
a at P is L′(a, P ) := L(a, P )\{a}.
An SCR F is Maskin monotonic if for any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and for any
a ∈ A: [a ∈ F (R), and for all i ∈ N L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,R′i) imply a ∈ F (R′)].
Similarly, an SCF F is Maskin monotonic if for any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and for
any a ∈ A: [a = F (R), and for all i ∈ N L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,R′i) ∀i ∈ N imply
a = F (R′)].
For any R ∈ L(A)N , the triplet (N,A,R) is a normal form game. A
function which associates each normal form game (N,A,R) with a subset of
A is called a solution concept.
Consider any abstract set Mi for each i ∈ N , called the strategy space of
the agent i. M =
∏
i∈N
Mi is called the strategy space. Take an onto function
pi : M → A, called the outcome function. Then the pair (M,pi) is called a
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mechanism.
Given a mechanism G = (M,pi) and a preference profile R ∈ L(A)N ,
uR ∈ L(M)N is defined as [∀i ∈ N , ∀m,m′ ∈ M : muRi m′ if and only if
pi(m)Ripi(m
′). Then the normal form game associated with the mechanism g
is G[R] = (N,M, uR).
Given an SCR F and a solution concept σ, a mechanism G = (M,pi) is
said to σ−implement F if for any R ∈ L(A)N , one has pi(σ(G[R])) = F (R).
An SCR F is said to be σ−implementable if there exists a mechanism
which σ−implements F .
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CHAPTER 3
WHICH SOCIAL CHOICE RULES HAVE
THE SAME CENTER?
For any alternative a ∈ A, the set of preference profiles can be partitioned
into equivalence classes with respect to the lower contour sets of a.
Definition. For any alternative a ∈ A, the set of equivalence classes on
L(A)N with respect the lower contour sets of a is defined as ρ(a) = {{R′ ∈
L(A)N : ∀ ∈ N, L(a,Ri) = L(a,R′i)} : R ∈ L(A)N}
Any preference profile belongs to some element of ρ(a) by definition. For
some a ∈ A, two elements taken from an equivalence class in the partition
ρ(a) induce the same lower contour set for any agent i ∈ N . What follow are
the notions of refinement and critical profile which will be very useful in the
rest.
Definition. For anyR,R′ ∈ L(A)N and a ∈ A we say thatR′ is an a−refinement
of R if for all i ∈ N one has L(a,R′i) ⊂ L(a,Ri). If at least one inclusion is
strict, then we also say that R′ is a strict a−refinement of R.
Definition. Let F be a Maskin monotonic SCR. For any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N
and a ∈ A, R is called an a−critical profile of F if a ∈ F (R) and for any
a−refinement R′ of R other than R, one has a /∈ F (R′).
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The set of all a−critical profiles of F is denoted by Ca(F ). Since F is
Maskin monotonic, it is easy to notice that if R is an a−critical profile and
R′ is such that lower contour sets of a at R and R′ are coincident, then R′
is also an a−critical profile. Then for each alternative a ∈ A there exist
elements of ρ(a), say S1, , S2, .., SI such that Ca(F ) =
I⋃
i=1
Si.
Definition. Let F be a Maskin monotonic SCR, a ∈ A, and Ca(F ) =
I⋃
i=1
Si
for some S1, S2, .., SI ∈ ρ(a). Take a profile Ri from each set Si. Then the
set {R1, R2, ..., RI} is called an a−center of F . An a−center is denoted by
CEa(F ), and a set CE(F ) :=
⋃
a∈A
CEa(F ) is called a center of F . (Note that
CEa(F ) and CE(F ) are not uniquely determined.)
Center can be interpreted as the minimal set of profiles sufficient to iden-
tify an SCR. However, since it is not unique for the SCR, it is natural to
ask whether a set is a center for different profiles. The answer turns out to
be “yes”. In this chapter, our aim is to answer the question: “Given a set
of profiles T = {R1, R2, ..., Rq}, which Maskin monotonic social choice rules
induce T as a center?”.
Definition. For any a ∈ A and R ∈ L(A)N , the LCS function of a, fa :
L(A)N → (2A)|N | is defined as fa(R) = (L′(a,R1), L′(a,R2), ..., L′(a,RN)).
Throughout the rest, let n = |N | for the ease of notation. The function fa
associates each profile R ∈ L(A)N , the n−tuple of strict lower contour sets
of a at Ri. This function is crucial in identifying the link between the given
set T and the critical profiles.
Definition. For each i ∈ N , take a subset Ai of A. If there exists an
a−critical profile R for F with fa(R) = (A1, A2, ..., An), then the n−tuple
(A1, A2, ..., An) is called an a−critical LCS profile for F .
Definition. The set of all a−critical LCS profiles for F is called the refined
a−center of F .
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The notation LCS profile is used to refer to the fact that critical LCS
profiles are not preference profiles, but a collection of sets, particularly lower
contour sets. Refined a−center of F is denoted by RCa(F ). Check that
although a−center was not uniquely determined by F and a, refined a−center
is.
Definition. Refined center of F is defined as RC(F ) :=
∏
a∈A
RCa(F ).
Similarly, refined center is also uniquely determined by F , in contrast with
center.
We introduce the following sets, which will be constituting a feasibility
argument for refined center. Check that for any i ∈ N , R ∈ L(A)N , and
a ∈ A, a /∈ fa(R)i. Also recall that an a−critical profile cannot be a strict
refinement of another one. Hence an a−critical LCS profile cannot be a
component by component subset of another one. In the following definitions
we make use of these ideas.
Definition. Ya = {(Y1, Y2, ..., Yn) : ∀i ∈ N, Yi ⊂ A\{a}}, X a = {Y ⊂ Ya :
[X, Y ∈ Y , and ∀i ∈ N, Xi ⊂ Yi, imply X = Y ]}, X =
∏
a∈A
X a.
For the ease of notation, let F denote the set of all Maskin monotonic
SCR’s from L(A)N to A. Throughout the rest, with a small abuse of notation,
we consider RC as a funtion from F to X .
Proposition 1. RC is a bijection between F and X .
Proof. We will finish the proof in three steps.
i) RC is a well defined function:
Clear.
ii) ∀F ∈ F , RC(F ) ∈ X :
Assume that there exist X, Y ∈ RCa(F ) such that for all i ∈ N , Xi ⊂ Yi,
and X 6= Y . Let RX , RY be the corresponding a−critical profiles. “X 6= Y ”
implies that there exists j ∈ N with L′(a,RXj ) 6= L′(a,RYj ). Also, [for all
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i ∈ N , Xi ⊂ Yi] implies that [for all i ∈ N , L′(a,RXj ) ⊂ L′(a,RYj )]. Then RX
is an a−refinement of RY , but RY is an a−critical profile. Contradiction.
Thus for any X, Y ∈ RCa(F ), [for all i ∈ N , Xi ⊂ Yi] implies X = Y.
Clearly, X ∈ RCa(F ) implies X ⊂ A\{a}. Thus RC(F ) ∈ X .
iii) For all X ∈ X , there exists unique F ∈ F with RC(F ) = X:
Let X ∈ X . Assume that there exist F,G ∈ F such that F 6= G and
RC(F ) = RC(G) = X. Then let there exist a profile R such that F (R) 6=
G(R). Hence, there exists some alternative in F (R)\G(R), say a. Let R′ be
an a−critical profile for F , which is a a−refinement of R. Then,
fa(R
′) ∈ RCa(F ) = RCa(G)⇒ a ∈ G(R′)⇒ a ∈ G(R),
leading to a contradiction. Also check that F0 defined as F0(R) = {a ∈ A : ∃
an a−refinement of R′ of R with fa(R′) ∈ X a} is a Maskin monotonic SCR
with RC(F0) = X.
Turning back to our question, given a subset of L(A)N , say T = {R1, R2, ..., Rq},
which Maskin monotonic SCR’s induce T as a center?
Definition. Ta := {fa(R) : R ∈ T}, UTa := 2Ta ∩ X a.
Elements of UTa are feasible candidates for being a−critical LCS profiles
in accordance with T being a center.
Definition. Let fa,T : T → Ta be the restriction of fa to T, and gXa,T :
X ∩ Ta → T be the restriction of f−1a,T to X ∩ Ta.
Definition. UT = {X ∈ ∏
a∈A
UTa : ∀a ∈ A, gXaa,T has a singleton valued subcor-
respondence hXaa,T such that
⋃
a∈A
Im(hXaa,T ) = T}.
Note that UT is independent of F .
Proposition 2. T is a center of F if and only if RC(F ) ∈ UT .
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Proof. Let T be a center of F . For all a ∈ A denote Xa = RCa(F ). Now
for each a ∈ A, there exists an a−center CEa(F ) such that T = CE(F ) =⋃
a∈A
CEa(F ). Fix an alternative a ∈ A. Now there exist S1, S2, ..., SI ∈ ρ(a)
such that Ca(F ) =
I⋃
t=1
St. Then for each t ∈ {1, 2, ..., I}, there exists tR
so that CEa(F ) = {1R,2R, ...,I R}. Clearly Xa = {fa(R) : R ∈ CEa(F )}.
Since CEa(F ) ⊂ T, Xa ⊂ Ta. Also, since tR’s are a−critical profiles from
different equivalence classes (Si’s), we have Xa ∈ UTa . Now let ∀L ∈ Xa =
Xa ∩ Ta; hXaa,T (L) = f−1a (L) ∩ CEa(F ). Since tR’s are from different Si’s, hXaa,T
is singleton valued. It is also clear that hXaa,T is a subcorrespondence of g
Xa
a,T .
Recall that
⋃
a∈A
CEa(F ) = T. ∀R ∈ T, ∃a ∈ A with R ∈ CEa(F ).
fa(R) ∈ Xa∩Ta, thus hXaa,T (fa(R)) = f−1a (fa(R))∩CEa(F ) ⊃ {R}. Hence, R ∈
Im(hXaa,T ), which implies T ⊂
⋃
a∈A
Im(hXaa,T ). Also since h
Xa
a,T (L) ⊂ CEa(F ) ⊂ T,
we have
⋃
a∈A
Im(hXaa,T ) ⊂ T. Therefore T =
⋃
a∈A
Im(hXaa,T ). So, RC(F ) =⋃
a∈A
Xa ∈ UT .
For the converse, consider F ∈ F with RC(F ) ∈ UT . Let RC(F ) = X,
and for all a ∈ A, RCa(F ) = Xa. For all a ∈ A, define Va := Im(hXaa,T ).
X ∈ UT implies ⋃
a∈A
Va = T. (3.1)
There exist S1, S2, ..., SI ∈ ρ(a) such that Ca(F ) =
I⋃
t=1
St. We will follow
three steps in order to complete the proof.
i) R ∈ Va implies that there exists t ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} with R ∈ St:
R ∈ Va ⇒ hXaa,T (L) = R for some L ∈ Xa ∩ Ta = Xa. Hence R ∈ gXaa,T (L) =
f−1a,T (L) ⇒ fa(R) = L ∈ Xa = RCa(F ) ⇒ R is an a−critical profile⇒ R ∈
CEa(F ) =
⋃
i∈I
Si ⇒ R ∈ St for some t ∈ I.
ii) R,R′ ∈ Va, R 6= R′ implies that R and R′ are from different Si’s:
R,R′ ∈ Va = Im(hXaa,T )⇒ ∃L,L′ ∈ Xa with L 6= L′ since hXaa,T is singleton
valued. hXaa,T (L) = R, h
Xa
a,T (L
′) = R′ ⇒ R ∈ gXaa,T (L) = f−1a,T (L), R′ ∈ f−1a,T (L′)
⇒ L = fa(R), L′ = fa(R′) ⇒ fa(R) 6= fa(R′) since L 6= L′. Hence, R,R′
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are from different Si’s.
iii) ∀t ∈ I, St ∩ Va 6= ∅.
Take R ∈ St. R is an a−critical profile, thus fa(R) = RCa(F ) = Xa.
fa(R) ∈ Xa, then let R′ = hXaa,T (fa(R)). This implies that R ∈ gXaa,T (fa(R)) =
f−1a,T (fa,T (R)), i.e. fa(R) = fa(R
′),hence R′ ∈ St. Also R′ = hXaa,T (fa(R)) ⇒
R′ ∈ Im(hXaa,T ) = Va. So, R′ ∈ St ∩ Va.
Combining i, ii, iii, we obtain Va is an a−center for F and hence (3.1)
implies T =
⋃
a∈A
Va is a center for F.
Corollary. For any T ⊂ L(A)N , RC−1(UT ) = CE−1(T ).
Proof. Straightforward.
Corollary. T is a center for some Maskin monotonic SCR if and only if
UT 6= ∅.
Proof. Straightforward.
Corollary. Let T be a center for some F and T ′ ⊂ T. Then T ′ is a center
for some F ′.
Proof. Since T is a center for some F, UT 6= ∅. Consider X = ∏
a∈A
Xa ∈ UT .
Let X ′a = {M ∈ Xa : fa(R) = M for some R ∈ T ′}. It is clear that X ′a ∈ UT ′ .
Define h¯
X′a
a,T ′(L) := h
Xa
a,T (L) ∩ T ′. Clearly,
⋃
a∈A
Im(h¯
X′a
a,T ′) = T
′. Let hX
′
a
a,T ′ be
defined as:
h
X′a
a,T ′(L) =
 h¯
X
′
a
a,T ′ (L) if h¯
X
′
a
a,T ′ (L) 6= ∅,
an arbitrary R ∈ T ′ with fa(R) = L if otherwise.
It is straightforward from the construction that h
X′a
a,T ′ is a singleton valued
subcorrespondence of g
X′a
a,T ′ . Therefore,
∏
a∈A
X ′a ∈ UT ′ ⇒ UT ′ 6= ∅.
Despite the fact that notation is complicated and difficult to follow, what
we are doing is quite simple. In order to explain the process, consider the
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below table below. Each column is for a profile in T and each row is for an
alternative.
A R1 R2 .. .. Rq
a fa(R
1) fa(R
2) .. .. fa(R
q) → Ta (there are repititions)
b fb(R
1) fb(R
2) .. .. fb(R
q) → Tb (there are repititions)
c fc(R
1) fc(R
3) .. .. fc(R
q) → Tc (there are repititions)
.. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Take an alternative a. Note that there are repetitions in the group (fa(R
1),
fa(R
2), ... , fa(R
q)). Let Ta = {fa(Ri) : Ri ∈ T} = {Ma1 ,Ma2 , ...,Mapa}. Let rat
be defined as rat = {Ri ∈ T : fa(Ri) = Mat }. In order to explain, w.l.o.g let
fa(R
1) = fa(R
2) = Ma1 , fa(R
3) = Ma2 , ..., fa(R
q−2) = fa(Rq−1) = fa(Rq) =
Mapa , i.e. r
a
1 = {R1, R2}, ra2 = {R3}, ..., rapa = {Rq−2, Rq−1, Rq}. Hence the
row of a in the above table is as follows:
R1, R2︸ ︷︷ ︸ R3︸︷︷︸ ... Rq−2, Rq−1, Rq︸ ︷︷ ︸
a Ma1 M
a
2 ... M
a
pa → Ta (without repititions)
The tables for other alternatives have different shapes. For T to be a cen-
ter, we need to choose a Pareto optimal subset Ma of Ta = {Ma1 ,Ma2 , ...,Mapa},
in the sense that no pair of Mai ’s we choose can be component by component
inclusive. Moreover, we need to choose a single (at least one would be more
appropriate but more than one is unnecessary) profile from each rat . Cumu-
latively after doing this for each alternative, each profile Ri in T should have
been chosen at least once. Otherwise, a subset of T would be the center.
The Pareto optimal subsets of Ta’s we choose, i.e. Ma corresponds to Xa.
Chosen profile Ri’s for Mai correspond to a−critical profiles.
Note 1.
∑
a∈A
|Ta| =
∑
a∈A
|Ma| ≥ |T |.
Corollary. If T is a center, |A|2|N |(|A|−1) ≥ |T |.
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Proof. As noted above,
∑
a∈A
|Ta| ≥ |T |. Note that (2|A|−1)|N | ≥ |Ta|. Hence,
|A|2|N |(|A|−1) ≥ |T |.
Corollary. L(A)N is never a center.
Proof. If L(A)N is a center, we have |A|2|N |(|A|−1) ≥ (|A|!)|N |, which implies
|N|
√|A| ≥ |A|!
2|A|−1 . Then either |A| = 2, |N | ≥ 3 or |A| ∈ {2, 3}, |N | = 2.
However, |N | ≥ 3, |A| ≥ 3 were assumed in this chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
AN ALGORITHMIC
CHARACTERIZATION OF
SELF-MONOTONICITY
For this chapter, we relax the domain of the SCR’s we consider. We take a
set R ⊂ L(A)N , and consider Maskin mootonic SCR’s from R to A. In this
chapter, F will generically denote a Maskin monotonic SCR from R to A.
Definition. A monotonicity of F is a function h : Gr(F )→ (2A)n such that
for every (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ),
[Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′), ∀i ∈ N implies a ∈ F (R′)].
Corollary. If h is a monotonicity of F, then any h′ with [hi(a,R) ⊂ h′i(a,R),
∀i ∈ N, a ∈ A, R ∈ R] is also a monotonicity of F .
Corollary. h is a monotonicity of F if and only if ∀a ∈ A, R,R′ ∈ R with
a ∈ F (R)\F (R′), one has Li(a,R′)c ∩ Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R) 6= ∅.
Definition. h is a self monotonicity of F if h is a monotonicity of F , and
h′ : Gr(F )→ (2A)n with h′i(a,R) ⊂ hi(a,R), ∀(i, a, R) ∈ N ×Gr(F ), implies
h′ = h.
Corollary. If h is a self monotonicity of some F , then for all (i, a, R) ∈
N ×Gr(F ), hi(a,R) ⊂ L(a ,Ri)\{a}.
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Corollary. Let h and h′ be two self monotonicities of F . Take any subset
∆ of Gr(F ). Define h′′ as:
h′′i (a,R) =
 hi(a,R) if (a,R) ∈ ∆,h′i(a,R) if (a,R) /∈ ∆.
Then h′′ is also a self monotonicity of F.
In the light of the above corollary, one may claim that, by characterizing
a self monotonicity at a single pair (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ), we would have character-
ized all self monotonicities cumulatively for its domain. With a small abuse of
language, from now on, we will say h(a,R) is a self monotonicity and charac-
terize the possible sets for (a,R), which makes h a self monotonicity. Fix some
(a¯, R¯) ∈ Gr(F ) for the rest of the chapter. Let R∗ = {R ∈ R : a¯ /∈ F (R)},
k = |R∗|, Li = L(a¯, R¯i)\{a}.
Definition. The correspondence G : N × A → R∗ is defined as G(i, b) =
{R ∈ R∗ : b ∈ Li ∩ L(a¯, Ri)c}.
By Maskin monotonicity of F , ∀R ∈ R∗, ∃(i, b) ∈ N×A with R ∈ G(i, b).
Definition. For M ⊂ R∗, define T (M) := {(i, b) ∈ N × A : G(i, b) = M}.
Let G := {M ⊂ R∗ : T (M) 6= ∅}.
Definition. A pair (f, g) is “nice” if there exists s ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, f : {1, 2, ..., s} →
R∗ is a 1-1 function, and g is a nonempty valued correspondence g : R∗f →
{1, 2, ..., s}, where R∗f = R∗\Im(f).
Definition. For any nice pair (f, g), and for any t ∈ {1, 2, ..., |Dom(f)|},
At(f, g) := {f(t)} ∪ g−1(t).
Definition. A class of set of profiles A¯ = {A1, A2, ..., As} is “(f, g)−feasible”
if (f, g) is a nice pair with s = |Dom(f)| and At = At(f, g), ∀t ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}.
A¯′ = {A′1, A′2, ..., A′s′} is “feasible” if there exists a nice pair (f, g) for which
A¯′ is (f, g)−feasible.
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Let F be the set of all feasible set of set of profiles and FG = F ∩ 2G.
Definition. A function H is “good” if Dom(H) ∈ FG and Gr(H) ⊂ Gr(T ).
Definition. For every good H, hH is defined as hHi = {b ∈ A : (i, b) ∈
Range(H)}, ∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 1. h(a¯, R¯) is a self monotonicity if and only if h(a¯, R¯) = hH for
some good H.
Proof. Let h(a¯, R¯) be a self monotonicity. For the ease of notation, let hi =
hi(a¯, R¯). From corollary (1), hi ⊂ Li, ∀i ∈ N. Let B := {(i, b) ∈ N×A : b ∈ hi
for some i}, and T := {M ⊂ R∗ : G(i, b) = M for some (i, b) ∈ B}.
We claim that each element of T includes a profile which is not included
in other elements of T, i.e. ∀M ∈ T,∃R ∈ R∗ such that R ∈M, and R /∈M ′
for any M ′ ∈ T with M 6= M ′. Suppose otherwise, then ∃M0 ∈ T such that
M0 ⊂
⋃
M ′ 6=M0,M ′∈T
M ′. There exists an element (i′, b′) of B with G(i′, b′) = M0.
Define h∗ as h∗i′ := hi′\{b′} and h∗i = hi, ∀i 6= i′. Take any R ∈ R∗. Since h is a
monotonicity, there exists i ∈ N, b ∈ A with b ∈ hi∩L(a¯, R)c. If (i, b) 6= (i′, b′),
clearly b ∈ h∗i ∩ L(a¯, R)c. If (i, b) = (i′, b′), since M0 ⊂
⋃
M ′ 6=M0,M ′∈T
M ′, there
exists M ′′ ∈ T other than M0 with R ∈ M ′′. Since M ′′ 6= M0, there exists
(i′′, b′′) 6= (i′, b′) with G(i′′, b′′) = M ′′. Then since R ∈M ′′, b′′ ∈ hi′′∩L(a¯, R)c.
Note that, (i′′, b′′) 6= (i′, b′) = (i, b), hence b′′ ∈ hi′′ if and only if b′′ ∈ h∗i′′ .
Then, b′′ ∈ h∗i′′ ∩ L(a¯, R)c. Therefore, for every R ∈ R∗, there exists i ∈ N
with h∗i ∩L(a¯, R)c 6= ∅. Hence h∗ is also a monotonicity. Note that h∗i ⊂ hi, ∀i
and h∗ 6= h, which is contradiction with the fact that h is a self monotonicity.
Let s = |T |. Now that we have proved that each element of T includes a
profile which is not included in other elements of T , we have s ≤ |R∗| = k.
Let T = {M1,M2, ...,Ms}. In the light of the above claim, let R1, R2, ..., Rs
be profiles so that Ri is only present in Mi. Define f : {1, 2, ..., s} → R∗ as
f(n) = Rn. Clearly f is a 1-1 function. Let R∗f = R∗\{R1, ..., Rs}. Define
g : R∗f → {1, 2, ..., s} as g(R) = {n : R ∈ Mn}. ∀R ∈ R∗f ⊂ R∗, there exists
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(i, b) ∈ B with R ∈ G(i, b) ∈ T = {M1, ...,Ms} since h is a monotonicity.
Then g is a nonempty valued correspondence. Thus (f, g) is a nice pair.
Now we will prove that Mn = {f(n)}∪g−1(n), ∀n ∈ {1, 2, ..., s}. Take any
R ∈ {f(n)}∪ g−1(n). If R = f(n), clearly R = Rn ∈Mn. If R ∈ g−1(n), from
the definition of g, n ∈ g(R) implies R ∈ Mn. Then {f(n)} ∪ g−1(n) ⊂ Mn.
For the converse part, take any R ∈ Mn. Recall that R∗f = R∗\{R1, ..., Rs},
i.e. R∗ = ⋃
t∈{1,..,s}
{f(t)} ∪ R∗f . If R ∈
⋃
t∈{1,..,s}
{f(t)}, clearly R = Rn = f(n)
since R ∈ Mn. If R ∈ R∗f , since R ∈ Mn, n ∈ g(R), hence R ∈ g−1(n).
Therefore, Mn ⊂ {f(n)} ∪ g−1(n), hence {f(n)} ∪ g−1(n) = Mn. In other
words, T = {M1, ...,Ms}, s = |Dom(f)|, Mt = At(f, g), where (f, g) is a
nice pair. Hence T is (f, g) feasible, thus feasible, i.e. T ∈ F . Moreover,
notice that from the definition of T , there exists (i, b) ∈ B for every n so that
G(i, b) = Mn, hence T (Mn) 6= ∅ implying that Mn ∈ G. Therefore, finally we
get T ∈ FG.
Consider (i′, b′), (i′′, b′′) ∈ B with (i′, b′) 6= (i′′, b′′). If G(i′, b′) = G(i′′, b′′),
define h∗ as h∗i′′ = hi′′\{b′′} and h∗i = hi, ∀i 6= i′′. Clearly h∗ is still a mono-
tonicity but h∗i ⊂ hi, ∀i, contradicting with the fact that h is a self mono-
tonicity. Then H : T → N ×A defined as H(M) = {(i, b) ∈ B : G(i, b) = M}
is a well defined function. Clearly H(M) ∈ T (M) and T ∈ FG, concluding
that H is good.
What is left to prove for the left implication is that hi = {b ∈ A : (i, b) ∈
Range(H)}, ∀i. But notice that from the definition of H, Range(H) =
{(i, b) ∈ B : G(i, b) = M for some M ∈ T}, which is indeed equal to B.
B = {(i, b) ∈ N × A : b ∈ hi for some i}, hence {b ∈ A : (i, b) ∈ B} = hi.
For the right implication, let H be good. We will prove that hH is a self
monotonicity. Denote X = Dom(H), where X is (f, g)−feasible for some
nice pair (f, g), and also denote s = |Dom(f)| = |Dom(H)|. (It is trivial that
|Dom(f)| = |Dom(H)|).
The first step is to prove that hH is a monotonicity. Take any R ∈ R∗.
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Let X = {A1, A2, ..., As}, where At = At(f, g) = {f(t)} ∪ g−1(t). It is clear
that
⋃
t∈{1,..,s}
At = R∗ the definition of g, hence R ∈ At for some t. Let
(i, b) = H(At) ∈ T (At). We have G(i, b) = At, hence R ∈ G(i, b) implying
that b ∈ Li ∩ L(a¯, Ri)c. We also know that (i, b) = H(At), hence b ∈ {b′ ∈
A : (i, b) ∈ Range(H)} = hHi . Then, b ∈ hHi ∩ Li ∩ L(a¯, Ri)c. Therefore
hHi ∩ Li ∩ L(a¯, Ri)c 6= ∅ for every R ∈ R∗.
The second and final step is to show that hHi is a self monotonicity. Assume
the contrary: there exists a monotonicity h
′ 6= hH with h′j ⊂ hHj , ∀j. There
exists a pair (i, b) such that b ∈ hHi \h′i. Then define h∗ as h∗i = hHi \{b},
and h∗j = h
H
j , ∀j 6= i. Clearly, h′j ⊂ h∗j , ∀j, hence h∗ is also a monotonicity.
b ∈ hi, hence (i, b) = H(At) for some t ∈ {1, 2, .., s}. Consider R = f(t).
Note that this implies R ∈ G(i, b). Since R ∈ R∗ and h∗ is a monotonicity,
there exists (i′, b′) such that b′ ∈ h∗i′ ∩ L(a¯, Ri′)c ⊂ hi′ ∩ L(a¯, Ri′)c, implying
that R ∈ G(i′, b′). But recall that from definitions of f and g, the profiles in
the domain of f are present in exactly one of the elements of X. Hence R ∈
G(i′, b′) and R ∈ G(i, b) imply (i′, b′) = (i, b). But then, b′ ∈ h∗i′ ∩ L(a¯, Ri′)c
implying that b ∈ h∗i = hHi \{b} yields a contradiction.
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CHAPTER 5
PRESERVATION OF MASKIN
MONOTONICITY
One natural question when investigating Maskin monotonic social choice rules
is that whether the union or intersection of two Maskin monotonic social
choice rules is still Maskin monotonic. The answer is easily “Yes” in case of
union or intersection. We may also ask “Under what binary set operations,
like union or intersection, Maskin monotonicity is preserved?”. Later on,
it will turn out that the class of binary set operations that preserve Maskin
monotonicity is nothing more than a very natural class that trivially preserves
Maskin monotonicity. In this chapter, we assume that |N | ≥ 3, |A| ≥ 3.
Definition. A binary set operation on A is a function ∗ : 2A × 2A → 2A.
Definition. Given any social choice rules F,G : L(A)N → 2A, F ∗ G :
L(A)N → 2A is defined as [for all R ∈ L(A)N , F ∗G(R) = F (R) ∗G(R)].
Definition. We say that a binary set operation ∗ preserves Maskin mono-
tonicity if, given any two Maskin monotonic social choice rules F,G : L(A)N →
2A, F ∗G is also Maskin monotonic.
We now prove the following proposition which is in the heart of the char-
acterization of the binary set operations that preserve Maskin monotonicity.
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Proposition 3. ∗ preserves Maskin monotonicity if and only if, ∀a ∈ A, ∀W,
X, Y, Z ⊂ A one has:
 a ∈ W ⇒ a ∈ X
a ∈ Y ⇒ a ∈ Z
 implies [a ∈ W ∗ Y ⇒ a ∈ X ∗ Z]. (5.1)
Proof. Take any two Maskin monotonic SCRs F,G : L(A)N → 2A. ∀R,R′ ∈
L(A)N , a ∈ A with L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,R′i), ∀i, we have a ∈ F (R) ⇒ a ∈ F (R′)
and a ∈ G(R)⇒ a ∈ G(R′). Then by (5.1), a ∈ F ∗G(R)⇒ a ∈ F ∗G(R′),
hence F ∗ G is Maskin monotonic. Conversely suppose that there exists an
operation ∗ such that it preserves Maskin monotonicity but does not satisfy
(5.1). Then there exists a ∈ A, W,X, Y, Z ⊂ A, such that (W ∩ {a}) ⊂
(X ∩ {a}) , (Y ∩ {a}) ⊂ (Z ∩ {a}) , a ∈ W ∗ Y, a /∈ X ∗ Z. In order to
obtain a contradiction, we will construct specific Maskin monotonic social
choice rules F,G : L(A)N → 2A, such that there exists R,R′ ∈ L(A)N with
L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,R′i), F (R) = W, F (R′) = X, G(R) = Y, G(R′) = Z.
For the ease of notation, let A = {a, x1, x2, ..., xs}, s ≥ 2. Fix some P ∈
L(A)N , define R,R′ as:
R1 : x1R1x2R1...R1xsR1a,
R2 : xsR2x1R2x2R2...R2xs−1R2a,
R3 : xs−1R3xsR3x1R3x2R3...R3a,
Ri = P, ∀i /∈ {1, 2, 3},
R′1 : aR
′
1x1R
′
1x2R
′
1...R
′
1xs,
R′2 : x1R
′
2x2R
′
2...R
′
2xsR
′
2a,
R′3 : xsR
′
3x1R
′
3x2R
′
3...R
′
3a,
R′i = P, ∀i /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
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Notice that for any x ∈ A with x 6= a, neither R, nor R′ is an x−refinement
of the other. Hence Maskin monotonicity of F and G does not imply any
inclusion between F (R) and F (R′), and between G(R) and G(R′), except
[a ∈ F (R)⇒ a ∈ F (R′)] and [a ∈ G(R)⇒ a ∈ G(R′)]. Then it is natural to
define F and G as follows: For every x 6= a :
if x ∈ W,x ∈ X : RCx(F ) = {fx(R), fx(R′)},
if x ∈ W,x /∈ X : RCx(F ) = {fx(R)},
if x /∈ W,x ∈ X : RCx(F ) = {fx(R′)},
if x /∈ W,x /∈ X : RCx(F ) = ∅.
For a :
if a ∈ W : RCa(F ) = {fa(R)},
if a /∈ W,a ∈ X : RCa(F ) = {fa(R′)},
if a /∈ X,Ca(F ) = ∅.
For every x 6= a :
if x ∈ Y, x ∈ Z : RCx(G) = {fx(R), fx(R′)},
if x ∈ Y, x /∈ Z : RCx(G) = {fx(R)},
if x /∈ Y, x ∈ Z : RCx(G) = {fx(R′)},
if x /∈ Y, x /∈ Z : RCx(G) = ∅.
For a :
if a ∈ Y : RCa(G) = {fa(R)},
if a /∈ Y, a ∈ Z : RCa(G) = {fa(R′)},
if a /∈ Y,RCa(G) = ∅.
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Now F and G are well defined monotonic SCRs with centers defined as above.
Note that F (R) = W, F (R′) = X, G(R) = Y, G(R′) = Z. Then a ∈ W ∗ Y =
F ∗ G(R), a /∈ X ∗ Z = F ∗ G(R′), although L(a,Ri) ⊂ L(a,R′i), ∀i. Thus
F ∗ G is not Maskin monotonic. Contradiction with the assumption that ∗
preserves Maskin monotonicity.
In the preceding parts, we will characterize binary operations ∗ : 2A×2A →
2A which satisfy (5.1).
Definition. For any ∗ : 2C × 2C → 2C , U, V ⊂ C, a ∈ C,
Υ(a, U, V, ∗) =

{a} ∩ (V ∗ V )
{a} ∩ (U ∗ V ) {a} ∩ (V ∗ U)
{a} ∩ (U ∗ U)
 .
Proposition 4. If ∗ satisfies (5.1), for any (U, V ), (U ′, V ′) with {a} ∩ U =
{a} ∩ U ′ and {a} ∩ V = {a} ∩ V ′, we have Υ(a, U, V, ∗) = Υ(a, U ′, V ′, ∗).
Proof. a ∈ U ⇔ a ∈ U ′, a ∈ V ⇔ a ∈ V ′. Then by (5.1), a ∈ U ∗ V ⇔
a ∈ U ′ ∗ V ′, a ∈ V ∗ U ⇔ a ∈ V ′ ∗ U ′, a ∈ U ∗ U ⇔ a ∈ U ′ ∗ U ′, and
a ∈ V ∗ V ⇔ a ∈ V ′ ∗ V ′. This means that Υ(a, U, V, ∗) = Υ(a, U ′, V ′, ∗).
Define ∗a : 2{a} × 2{a} → 2{a} where X ∗a Y = X ∗ Y . Then by the
above proposition, we have Υ(a, U, V, ∗) = Υ(a, U ∩ {a}, V ∩ {a}, ∗) which is
equal to Υ(a, U ∩ {a}, V ∩ {a}, ∗a). Thus for any U, V ⊂ A, (U ∗ V ) ∩ {a} =
(U ∩ {a}) ∗a (V ∩ {a}). Therefore,
U ∗ V =
⋃
a∈A
(U ∗ V ) ∩ {a} =
⋃
a∈A
(U ∩ {a}) ∗a (V ∩ {a}).
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Definition. ∗MMa = {∗1a, ∗2a, ∗3a, ∗4a, ∗5a, ∗6a}, where
∗1a =

∅
∅ ∅
∅
 , ∗2a =

∅
∅ ∅
{a}
 , ∗3a =

∅
{a} ∅
{a}
 ,
∗4a =

∅
∅ {a}
{a}
 , ∗5a =

∅
{a} {a}
{a}
 , ∗6a =

{a}
{a} {a}
{a}
 .
Proposition 5. If ∗ satisfies (5.1) and a ∈ A, Υ(a, {a}, ∅, ∗a) ∈ ∗MMa .
Proof. By (5.1),

a ∈ {a} ⇒ a ∈ {a}
a ∈ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ ∅
a ∈ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ {a}
⇒

a ∈ ∅ ∗ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ {a} ∗ {a}
a ∈ ∅ ∗ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ ∅ ∗ {a}
a ∈ ∅ ∗ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ {a} ∗ ∅
a ∈ {a} ∗ ∅ ⇒ a ∈ {a} ∗ {a}
a ∈ ∅ ∗ {a} ⇒ a ∈ {a} ∗ {a}

.
It is then clear that Υ(a, {a}, ∅, ∗a) ∈ ∗MMa .
Corollary. ∗ preserves Maskin monotonicity if and only if ∀U, V ⊂ A,
U ∗ V =
⋃
a∈A
(U ∩ {a}) ∗a (V ∩ {a}),
where ∀a ∈ A, Υ(a, {a}, ∅, ∗a) ∈ ∗MMa .
Proof. We have already proved that ∗ preserves Maskin monotonicity if and
only if ∗ satisfies (5.1), and if ∗ satisfies (5.1), ∗ satisfies the condition in the
corollary. The converse is rather trivial.
We should note that ∗1a corresponds to not choosing a in any case, ∗2a
corresponds to intersection, ∗3a corresponds to left operator, ∗4a corresponds
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to right operator, ∗5a corresponds to union and ∗6a corresponds to constantly
choosing a. It is interesting that these were the natural candidates at first
glance that preserve Maskin monotonicity. It turned out that considering
∗ alternative by alternative, union of these operations turned out to be the
exact characterization of the operations that preserve Maskin monotonicity.
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CHAPTER 6
NESTED DOMAINS OF IMPOSSIBILITY
AND POSSIBILITY
Under the assumption that there exists at least three alternatives, the well-
known Mueller-Satterthwaite Theorem states that an SCF F : L(A)N → A is
onto and Maskin monotonic if and only if it is dictatorial. To put it in other
words, it is impossible to find an SCF which is Maskin monotonic, onto, and
non-dictatoral if there are at least three alternatives. By relaxing the full
domain assumption and allowing the society to choose from only a subset
of preference profiles, we can get rid of this impossibility result. A domain
of impossibility is a subset D of L(A) where an SCF F : DN → A is onto
and Maskin monotonic if and only if it is dictatorial, under at least three
alternatives. Conversely, a domain of possibility is a subset D′ of L(A) where
there exists a non-dictatorial SCF F : D′N → A which is onto and Maskin
monotonic.
Since L(A) is the largest domain possible and is a domain of impossibility,
it initially gives rise to the idea that, roughly speaking, domains of impos-
sibility are larger than domains of possibility. Indeed, if we consider only
domains consisting of a center profile and all profiles within a certain radius
of this center with respect Manhattan metric, Koray and Gurer (2008) prove
that a domain is a domain of impossibility if and only if it has radius more
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than |A|. This is an elegant result distinguishing two types of domains with
a precise border.
However, the Manhattan metric directly counts the minimal number of
transpositions to obtain a profile from the other, particularly gives equal
weight to each transposition. From this perspective, we miss out whether
some transpositions are essential in impossibility. Moreover, it turns out that
this property of Manhattan metric is the main reason behind the result that
distinguishes two types of domains with a strict condition, namely having
radius less than |A| or otherwise.
We define a modified Manhattan metric, adding different numbers for
each transposition, and try to identify the essential reason of impossibility.
Moreover, it turns out that domains of possibility and impossibility can be
nested consecutively.
Denote |A| = n. Let p = (p1, p2, ..., pn−1) be a vector of positive real num-
bers. Different than Manhattan metric, we will add pi instead of 1 when
we transpose the alternatives in the ith and (i + 1)th places of a linear order
(thinking it as a column with most preferred at the top).
Example 1. For p =(2,
√
3);
i) dp(

a
b
c
 ,

a
c
b
) = √3
ii) dp(

a
b
c
 ,

c
b
a
) = min{2 +√3 + 2,√3 + 2 +√3} = 2√3 + 2.
Formally:
Definition. For given p = (p1, p2, ..., pn−1) ∈ Rn−1++ , and P1, P2 ∈ L(A), dp(P1,
P2) := min{
∑f
i=1 pTi : T = (T1, ..., Tf ) ∈ {1, 2, ..., n − 1}f so that after con-
secutive transpositions of T thi and (Ti + 1)
th elements of P1, we reach P2}.
Firstly, we shall prove that this is a well-defined metric:
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Proposition 6. For given p = (p1, p2, ..., pn−1) ∈ Rn−1++ , dp is a metric on
L(A).
Proof. i) It is clear that ∞ > dp(P1, P2) ≥ 0, ∀P1, P2 ∈ L(A).
ii) Since pi > 0, d
p(P1, P2) = 0 iff P1 = P2, ∀P1, P2 ∈ L(A).
iii) By just considering the transpositions from P1 to P2 in the inverse
order, it is easy to note that dp(P1, P2) ≥ dp(P2, P1). But then similarly,
dp(P2, P1) ≥ dp(P1, P2), hence dp(P1, P2) = dp(P2, P1), ∀P1, P2 ∈ L(A).
iv) Consider the transpositions from P1 to P2, and from P2 to P3. If we
add the transpositions, we reach from P1 to P3, but it need not be the shortest
path. Hence dp(P1, P2) + d
p(P2, P3) ≥ dp(P1, P3).
Note that for a Maskin monotonic SCF, being onto is equivalent to being
unanimous under full domain. Hence we will recast Mueller-Satterthwaite
theorem by replacing the condition of ontoness with unanimity in order to be
consistent with limited domains.
Definition. Let n ≥ 3.
i) D ⊂ L(A) is called a domain of impossibility if any Maskin monotonic
and unanimous SCF F : DN → A is dictatorial.
ii) D′ ⊂ L(A) is called a domain of possibility if there exists a non-
dictatorial, Maskin monotonic, and unanimous SCF F : D′N → A.
Theorem 2. Let n ≥ 3 and pn =∞. For given p = (p1, p2, ..., pn−1) ∈ Rn−1++ ,
P¯ ∈ L(A), and t ∈ {1, ..., n− 1},
i)
∑i=t
i=1 pi ≤ r < p2 +
∑i=t
i=1 pi ⇒ Bd
p
r (P¯ ) is a domain of possibility.
ii) p2 +
∑i=t
i=1 pi ≤ r <
∑i=t+1
i=1 pi ⇒ Bd
p
r (P¯ ) is a domain of impossibility..
Proof. Let P¯ =

x1
..
xn
 .
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i) Construct F : Bd
p
k (P¯ )→ A as
F (R) = {
xi if i 6= t+ 1 and xi is at the top in R1
xt+1 if xt+1 is at the top in R1 and xt+1R2x1
x1 if xt+1 is at the top in R1 and x1R2xt+1
It is clear that F is unanimous and non-dictatorial since R¯ =

xt+1 x1 ..
x1 x2
.. ..

∈ Bdpr (P¯ )N , and F (R¯) = x1 6= xt+1. What is left is to prove that F is Maskin
monotonic. For some R ∈ Bdpr (P¯ )N , let F (R) = xi. If i 6= 1, t + 1, then by
the construction, one must have xi is at the top in R1. Therefore, F (R
′) = xi
for any R′ ∈ Bdpr (P¯ )N with L(xi, Rj) ⊂ L(xi, R′j) ∀j.
If F (R) = x1 and x1 is at the top in R1 same method applies. If F (R) = x1
and x1 is not at the top in R1, then it must be the case that xt+1 is at the
top in R1 and x1R2xt+1. Note that R1 ∈ Bdpr (P¯ ) and xt+1 is at the top in R1,
but it takes at least
∑i=t
i=1 pi to take xt+1 to the top and k < p2 +
∑i=t
i=1 pi.
Therefore, x1 must be in the second place in R1. Take any R
′ ∈ Bdpr (P¯ )N
with L(x1, Rj) ⊂ L(x1, R′j) ∀j. Then either x1 is at the top in R′1 or xt+1 is at
top with x1 in the second place. Also x1 must be at the top in R
′
2. Therefore
F (R′) = x1.
If F (R) = xt+1, it is clear from the construction that F (R
′) = xt+1 for
any R′ ∈ Bdpr (P¯ ) with L(xt+1, Rj) ⊂ L(xt+1, R′j) ∀j. Therefore F is Maskin
monotonic, implying that Bd
p
r (P¯ ) is a domain of possibility.
ii) Assume that p2 +
∑i=t
i=1 pi ≤ r <
∑i=t+1
i=1 pi and F : B
dp
r (P¯ )
N → A is a
unanimous, Maskin monotonic SCF. We will prove that it is dictatorial.
Note that if P ∈ Bdpr (P¯ ), then xt+2, xt+3,.. cannot be at the top in P . Take
any k ∈ {1, .., t+1}. (If k = 1, replace x1 with x2 and x2 with x3 in the remain-
ing part. If k = 2,replace x2 with x3 in the remaining part. )Take xk as down
as as possible keeping all other alternatives in the same order in P¯ , so that
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the new ordering is still in Bd
p
r (P¯ ), and let this new ordering be S
k. Also let
P k =

xk
x1
x2
..

∈ Bdpr (P¯ ), and consider Rk =
[
P k P k .. P k
]
∈ Bdpr (P¯ )N .
By unanimity, F (Rk) = xk. Now, starting with R
k, column by column, take
xk as down as possible so that xk is still chosen and the new profile is still in
the domain, keeping all other orderings the same. Let the final profile be R′k.
At least one column of R′k should be P k, otherwise x1 would be chosen by
unanimity. Without loss of generality, let R′kj = P
k for some j. Now, take any
i ∈ N such that R′ki 6= P k and R′ki 6= Sk, if such i exists. Let xm be just below
xk in R
′k
i . Since R
′k
i 6= Sk, by switching xm and xk in R′ki , the new ordering
R′′ki is still in B
dp
r (P¯ ). It is also clear that P
′k =

x1
xk
x2
..

∈ Bdpr (P¯ ). Then
consider R′′k = [ .. R′kj−1 P
′k R′kj+1 .. R
′k
i−1 R
′′k
i R
′k
i+1 .. ] ∈ Bd
p
r (P¯ )
N .
By the definition of R′k, F (R′′k) 6= xk, then by Maskin monotonicity, F (R′′k)
should be both x1 and xm, leading to a contradiction. Therefore, for any
i ∈ N, R′ki = P k or R′ki = P k. Without loss of generality, let R′k1 , ..., R′kl = P k
and R′kl+1, ..., R
′k
N = P
k. We have already proved that l ≥ 1. Now assume that
l ≥ 2. Let P ′′k =

x2
xk
x1
..

and R′k,j be defined as
[ R′k1 R
′k
2 .. R
′k
j−1 P
′′k P ′′k .. P ′′k R′kl+1 R
′k
l+2 .. R
′k
N
].
We will prove by induction that F (R′k,j) = xk for every j ≥ 2. The initial
step is F (R′k,l) = xk.Maskin monotonicity easily implies that F (R′k,l) = x2
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or xk. Note that

xk
x2
x1
x3
..

∈ Bdpr (P¯ ). Now consider first three rows of columns
l − 1 and l. Keep everything else fixed.
xk xk
x1 x1
x2 x2
 F→ xk ⇒

xk xk
x1 x2
x2 x1
 F→ xk ⇒

x1 xk
xk x2
x2 x1
 F→ xk or x1.
If

x1 xk
xk x2
x2 x1
 F→ xk, then

x1 xk
xk x1
x2 x2
 F→ xk, which is a contradiction
with the definition of R′k.
Hence

x1 xk
xk x2
x2 x1
 F→ x1 ⇒

x1 x2
xk xk
x2 x1
 F→ x1 ⇒

xk x2
x1 xk
x2 x1
 F→ x1 or xk.
But also we know that

xk xk
x1 x1
x2 x2
 F→ xk ⇒

xk x2
x1 xk
x2 x1
 F→ x2 or xk.
Therefore

xk x2
x1 xk
x2 x1
 F→ xk, i.e. F (R′k,l) = xk. Inductively by similar
arguments, F (R′k,j) = xk for every j ≥ 2.
Now we know that F (R′k,2) = xk. However, x2 is unanimous in R′k,1,
hence F (R′k,1) = x2. Now consider the first two columns and three rows of
R′k,2.

xk x2
x1 xk
x2 x1
 F→ xk and

x2 x2
xk xk
x1 x1
 F→ x2.
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
xk x2
x1 xk
x2 x1
 F→ xk ⇒

xk x2
x2 xk
x1 x1
 F→ xk ⇒

xk x2
x2 x1
x1 xk
 F→ xk or x1.
Similarly as before, xk contradicts with the definition of R
′k.
Then,

xk x2
x2 x1
x1 xk
 F→ x1 ⇒

x2 x2
xk x1
x1 xk
 F→ x1.
However,

x2 x2
xk xk
x1 x1
 F→ x2 ⇒

x2 x2
xk x1
x1 xk
 F→ x2. Contradiction. There-
fore l = 1.
This means that for every k ∈ {1, 2, ..., t + 1}, ∃ik ∈ N with F (R¯k) = xk
where R¯kik = P
k and R¯kj = S
k ∀j 6= ik. It is clear that ik1 = ik2 ∀k1, k2 ∈
{1, 2, ..., t+ 1}. Then ik1 ≡ i is a dictator.
Particularly, if p2 is the largest of all pi’s then we obtain the largest possible
domain in terms of a center and a radius around it. Here, largest means that
it contains all other domains of possibility that we consider. On the other
hand, if p2 is the smallest of all pi’s, then we obtain many nested domains of
impossibility and possibility. This is a rather strange result meaning that an
increment in the freedom of people could lead to feasibility of socially desirable
outcomes, as well as it could lead to infeasibility of socially desirable outcomes
depending on the current state.
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CHAPTER 7
NASH-IMPLEMENTATION AND
NEUTRALITY
7.1 NEUTRALITY VS NO-VETO-POWER
By Maskin’s well known theorem, we know that no-veto-power (NVP) plus
Maskin monotonicity is a sufficient condition for Nash-implementability, as
well as Neutrality plus Maskin monotonicity is. Moreover, Maskin monotonic-
ity is a necessary condition. Then a natural task is to narrow the conditions to
derive a necessary and sufficient condition. From the NVP version of the the-
orem, the task is achieved by Moore and Repullo (1990). They, in some sense
weaken NVP to derive a necessary and sufficient condition, but they tolerate
what they lose with this relaxation, by strengthening Maskin monotonicity
and including some kind of unanimity. This chapter is a first attempt to
derive a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of weakening Neutrality.
But why do we have the idea that Neutrality can be weakened in a mean-
ingful way to arrive at a necessary and sufficient condition ? The well-known
Maskin-Wind mechanism is also used to prove that Neutrality plus Maskin
monotonicity is a sufficient condition. But the only role of Neutrality in the
proof is to allow for a transposition of two alternatives. Then indeed, in-
stead of neutral SCRs, which is a very restrictive class, the SCRs which are
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”neutral” under transpositions are also Nash-implementable if they are also
Maskin monotonic.
Mainly, we will be trying to find a subset of all permutations on the al-
ternatives, which allows us to get a necessary and sufficient condition. We
will be keeping Maskin monotonicity as a fixed condition for all the cases
we consider, although we must admit that this makes our approach weaker,
since being a necessary condition does not imply being a part of any group of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Moreover, Moore and Repullo (1977)also
do not take Maskin monotonicity as a condition in their statement, but mod-
ify it. However, as said before, this is a first attempt, trying to make the
analysis and its difficulties clearer, hopefully leading the way to a genuine
characterization.
7.2 WEAKINING NEUTRALITY
We will working under the full domain assumption: R = L(A)N . Let M
denote the class of all Maskin monotonic SCRs F : R → A, and I ⊂ M
denote the class of all Nash-implementable SCRs F : R → A.
Definition. A permutation on A is a bijection σ : A→ A. Denote the set of
all permutations on A by P .
We will consider only the permutations on A, yet call them only permu-
tations. For every R ∈ R, and σ ∈ P , with a small abuse of notation, denote
σ(R) ∈ R as the profile defined as [∀a, b ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N, aσ(R)ib if and only
if σ−1(a)Riσ−1(b)], or equivalently [∀a, b ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N, aRib if and only if
σ(a)σ(R)iσ(b)]. Denote σ0, the trivial permutation σ0(a) = a, ∀a ∈ A.
Roughly speaking, a neutrality of an SCR is a permutation that satisfies
the condition in the neutrality definition of an SCR. Throughout the chapter,
we will be working in the class M. We will try different approaches for the
characterization of Nash-implementation from the viewpoint of neutrality.
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There are two main categories. First is SCR-independent, and second is
SCR-dependent. More precisely, we will try to find a class of permutations
independent of the function in question, or dependent upon the function,
which constitutes an if and only if condition by being employed as neutralities
of the function. We will make a rigorous analysis in the SCR-independent
case: we will consider three main alternatives: the desired class of alternatives
will be defined globally meaning that it is independent of either the profile
or the alternative in question, or it will dependent upon the profile only, or
both profile and the alternative in question. In the SCR-dependent case, we
consider only the case where the desired subset of the permutations defined
specifically for each agent, alternative, profile, and the function, and introduce
a characterization in terms of permutations. As we move forward in the
chapter, these will become much more clearer.
7.2.1 SCR-INDEPENDENT APPROACH
First we should make our ways of analysis clearer. We seek answers to ques-
tions noted in cases below. First part is whether there exists a subset of
permutations defined globally that constitutes a necessary and sufficient con-
dition.
Definition (SCR-independent, global). An α−neutrality of F ∈ M is a
permutation σ ∈ P with [a ∈ F (R) ⇒ σ(a) ∈ F (σ(R)), ∀a ∈ A, ∀R ∈ R].
All α−neutralities of F is denoted by Nα(F ).
The question is now, whether there exists a class of permutations T ⊂ P ,
so that:
Case 1. F ∈M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T ⊂ N α(F )].
Case 2. F ∈M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T ∩ N α(F ) 6= ∅].
The second question is whether there exists a subset of permutations de-
fined for each profile that yields a necessary and sufficient condition.
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Definition (SCR-independent, profile-wise). A β−neutrality of (F,R) ∈
M×R is a permutation σ ∈ P with [a ∈ F (R)⇒ σ(a) ∈ F (σ(R)), ∀a ∈ A].
All β−neutralities of (F,R) is denoted by Nβ(F,R).
Now, does there exists a function T : R → 2P so that for given profile R,
T (R) satisfies:
Case 3. F ∈M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T (R)⊂ N β(F,R), ∀R ∈ R].
Case 4. F ∈M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T (R)∩N β(F,R) 6= ∅, ∀R ∈ R].
The final question is, what if the set is defined for specifically for an
alternative and a profile.
Definition (SCR-independent, alternative-wise). A θ−neutrality of (F, a, R)
∈ M× A ×R is a permutation σ ∈ P with [a ∈ F (R) ⇒ σ(a) ∈ F (σ(R))].
All θ−neutralities of (F, a,R) is denoted by Nθ(F, a,R).
Does there exists a function T : A×R → 2P so that for given alternative
a and profile R, T (a,R) satisfies:
Case 5. F ∈ M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T (a,R)⊂ N θ(F, a,R), ∀a,R ∈
A×R].
Case 6. F ∈ M, then [F ∈ I if and only if T (a,R)∩N θ(F, a,R) 6= ∅,
∀a,R ∈ A×R].
The answer to first five of these questions is unfortunately ”no”, and sixth
case is left open.
Case 1. Suppose otherwise. Take any σ ∈ T . For each a ∈ A, let Fa be the
constant SCR Fa ≡ {a}. Clearly Fa ∈ I. Then σ ∈ T ⊂ Nα(Fa). Take any
R ∈ R. a ∈ {a} = Fa(R) ⇒ σ(a) ∈ Fa(σ(R)) = {a} ⇒ σ(a) = a. Therefore,
∀σ ∈ T , a ∈ A, σ(a) = a, hence σ = σ0. But then T = {σ0} implies that
M = I, contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose otherwise. Take f : A → N0 a function. Define Ff as
Ff (R) = {x ∈ A : x is the top alternative of at least f(x) people in R}.
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Clearly Ff ∈ M. Also note that if f(x) ≤ |N | − 1, ∀x ∈ A, then Ff
satisfies NVP, which implies Ff ∈ I. Particularly, consider the following
case: |A| ≥ 2, |N | = |A|(|A|+ 1)/2. Let A = {a1, ..., a|A|}. Define f0(ak) = k,
∀k ∈ {1, 2, .., |A|}. Since m ≥ 2, |N |−1 ≥ |A| ≥ f0(x), ∀x ∈ A. Thus Ff0 ∈ I.
Let R0 be defined as:
R0 =
1 time 2 times 3 times |A| times︷︸︸︷
a1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
a2 a2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
a3 a3 a3 ...
︷ ︸︸ ︷
a|A| a|A|..a|A|
.. .. .. ..
.. .. .. ..
.
Now clearly Ff0(R0) = A. Take any σ ∈ Nα(Ff0). Since Ff0(R0) = A, we
have σ(A) = A ⊂ Ff0(σ(R0)). Then each alternative is chosen at σ(R0),
which implies that ak is top alternative of at least k people in σ(R0). But
then, we must have σ(a|A|) = a|A| ⇒ σ(a|A−1|) = a|A−1| ⇒...⇒ σ(a1) = a1, i.e.
σ = σ0. Therefore Nα(Ff0) = {σ0}. Since T ∩ Nα(Ff0) 6= ∅, we have σ0 ∈ T ,
implying that M = I, contradiction.
Case 3. Suppose otherwise. Consider a profile R ∈ R. Take any σ ∈ T (R).
For each a ∈ A, let Fa be the constant SCR Fa ≡ {a}. Clearly Fa ∈ I. Then
σ ∈ T (R) ⊂ Nα(Fa, R). Thus a ∈ {a} = Fa(R) ⇒ σ(a) ∈ Fa(σ(R)) = {a}
⇒ σ(a) = a. Hence, σ = σ0, implying that T (R) = {σ0}, ∀R ∈ R. But then
we get the same contradiction: M = I.
Case 4. Suppose otherwise. Let K = {1, 2, ..., |A|}. For any x ∈ KN , ”the
upper partition associated with x” is the function T x : R → (2A)N defined as
T xi (R) is the top xi alternatives in Ri. Any T ∈
⋃
x∈KN
T x is called an ”upper
partition”. For any upper partition T and a ∈ A, define mTa := |{i ∈ N :
a ∈ Ti(R¯)}|. For any R¯ ∈ R, a feasible upper partition for R¯ is an upper
partition T such that:
1) ∀a, b ∈ A with a 6= b, one has mTa 6= mTb ,
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2) At most one element of {mTx : x ∈ A} can be larger than or equal to
|N | − 1.
We continue with the assumption that there exists a feasible upper par-
tition for every profile. We will prove this for specific values of |N |, |A| at
the end of the proof. Now for each R¯ ∈ R, fix a feasible upper partition
R¯T , and let it be the upper partition associated with R¯x. Define nR¯a as
nR¯a = m
R¯T
a if m
R¯T
a ≤ |N | − 2, and nR¯a = |N | − 1 if otherwise. Define FR¯ as
FR¯(R) = {a ∈ A : nR¯a ≤ |M R¯a (R)|}, where M R¯a (R) = {i ∈ N : a ∈ R¯Ti(R)}.
Now we will show that FR¯ ∈ M and satisfies NVP, hence FR¯ ∈ I.
FR¯ ∈ M: a ∈ FR¯(R) means a ∈ R¯Ti(R) for at least nR¯a people, i.e. a is
one the top R¯xi alternatives in Ri for at least n
R¯
a people. If R
′ is such that
R is an a−refinement of R′, then obviously it will still remain that way in R′,
i.e. a ∈ FR¯(R′).
FR¯ satisfies NVP: If |N |−1 people puts a to top place in R, since R¯xi ≥ 1,
∀i ∈ N, and nR¯b ≤ |N | − 1, ∀b ∈ A, we get [∃j, a ∈ R¯Ti(R), ∀i 6= j ⇒
|M R¯a (R)| ≥ |N | − 1 ≥ nR¯a ⇒ a ∈ FR¯(R). Therefore FR¯ ∈ I.
Now take any σ ∈ Nβ(FR¯, R¯). Clearly, FR¯(R¯) = A since nR¯a ≤ mR¯Tx =
|M R¯a (R¯)|, ∀a ∈ A. Hence A = σ(A) ⊂ FR¯(σ(R¯)). Then ∀a ∈ A, nR¯a ≤
|M R¯a (σ(R¯))|. We will prove that σ = σ0.
Let nR¯b = |N | − 1 if such b ∈ A exists. We have nR¯b ≤ |M R¯b (σ(R¯))|.
Since σ is a permutation, M R¯b (σ(R¯)) = M
R¯
c (R¯) = m
R¯T
c for c = σ
−1(b). Then
|N | − 1 ≤ mR¯Tc . Recall that in a feasible upper partition, at most element
could have mTx ≥ |N | − 1, and c is indeed that element. But then, since
c ∈ FR¯(σ(R¯)), we have |N | − 1 = nR¯c ≤ |M R¯c (σ(R))| implying that b = c, i.e.
σ(b) = b.
Let A∗ = {a ∈ A : nR¯a = mR¯Ta ≤ |N |−2}. ∀a ∈ A∗, since a ∈ FR¯(σ(R¯)), we
have nR¯a ≤ |M R¯a (σ(R¯))| = |M R¯σ−1(a)(R¯)| = m
R¯T
σ−1(a) = n
R¯
σ−1(a), i.e. n
R¯
a ≤ nR¯σ−1(a),
∀a ∈ A∗. However, we know that σ(A∗) = A∗, since σ(b) = b even if such
b exists. Therefore for every k, σ−k(a) ∈ A∗, and there exists a k∗ with
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σ−k
∗
(a) = a. Then we have, nR¯a ≤ nR¯σ−1(a) ≤ nR¯σ−2(a) ≤ ... ≤ nR¯σ−k(a) = nR¯a ,
implying that nR¯a = n
R¯
σ−1(a). By definiton of a feasible upper partition, we
know that nR¯a ’s are pairwise different. Then n
R¯
a = n
R¯
σ−1(a) implies that a =
σ−1(a), i.e. σ(a) = a. Combining both paragraphs, we obtain σ(a) = a,
∀a ∈ A.
Therefore,Nβ(FR¯, R¯) = {σ0}, ∀R¯ ∈ R. Since FR¯ ∈ I, T (R¯)∩Nβ(FR¯, R¯) 6=
∅, hence σ0 ∈ T (R¯), ∀R¯ ∈ R. But then, again, M = I, contradiction.
What is left show the existence of a feasible upper partition for each
profile. For simplicity, consider |A| = 3, |N | = 4. Without loss of generality,
there are four kinds of profiles according to their first rows:
R1 =

a a a a
 , R2 =

a a a b
 ,
R3 =

a a b b
 , R4 =

a a b c
 .
1) Consider R1. Either b or c passes twice in the second row. Wlog, let
it be b. Take a column with a top, b second. The third place is clearly
c. Then the starred region in the figure constitutes a feasible upper par-
tition, where x = (3, 2, 1, 1) and mR
1
a = 4, m
R1
b = 2, m
R1
c = 1. R
1 =
∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(a)
∗(b) ∗(b)
∗(c)
 .
2) Consider R2. Take any column with a in the top. Then the starred
region in the figure constitutes a feasible upper partition, where x = (3, 1, 1, 1)
and mR
2
a = 3, m
R2
b = 2, m
R2
c = 1. R
2 =

∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(b)
∗(b or c)
∗(c or b)
 .
38
3) Consider R3. Take any column with b in the top. Then the starred
region in the figure constitutes a feasible upper partition, where x = (1, 1, 1, 3)
and mR
3
a = 3, m
R3
b = 2, m
R3
c = 1. R
3 =

∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(b) ∗(b)
∗(a or c)
∗(c or a)
 .
4) Consider R4. Take the column with c in the top. Then the starred
region in the figure constitutes a feasible upper partition, where x = (1, 1, 1, 3)
and mR
4
a = 3, m
R4
b = 2, m
R4
c = 1. R
4 =

∗(a) ∗(a) ∗(b) ∗(c)
∗(a or b)
∗(b or a)
 .
Case 5. Suppose otherwise. Consider Fa ≡ {a}, the constant SCR. We have
Fa ∈ I, and Nθ(Fa, a, R) = {σ ∈ P : σ(a) = a} =: Ca. Then T (a,R) ⊂⋂
F∈I
Nθ(F, a,R) =
⋂
F∈I
(Nθ(F, a,R)∩Ca). Let Ri be a profile where i top ranks
a, and all other bottom rank a. Let F a be the following SCR:
1) ∀b ∈ A, RCb(F a) = ∅N , (b is chosen at every profile)
2) RCa(F
a) = {fa(R)} ∪ {fa(Ri) : i ∈ N and R is not an a−refinement
of Ri}.
It is straightforward that F a is Maskin monotonic and satisfies NVP,
hence F a ∈ I. Take any σ ∈ Nθ(F a, a, R) ∩ Ca, i.e. a = σ(a) and a ∈
F a(σ(R)). Since a ∈ F a(σ(R)), there exists an a−critical profile R¯ which is
an a−refinement of σ(R).
If fa(R¯) = fa(R
i) for some i ∈ N , then Ri is an a−critical profile and also
an a−refinement of σ(R). Now a is at the bottom at Rii, a is at the top at
Rij ∀j 6= i, σ(a) = a, and Ri is an a−refinement of σ(R). But these together
imply that Ri is an a−refinement of R, which is a contradiction with Ri being
an a−critical profile.
On the other hand, if fa(R¯) = fa(R), then we have R is an a−critical
profile and also an a−refinement of σ(R). But then, since σ(a) = a, we
have σ(L′(a,Ri)) = L′(a,Ri), ∀i ∈ N . Let Da,R := {σ ∈ P : σ(a) = a and
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σ(L′(a,Ri)) = L′(a,Ri), ∀i ∈ N}. Then T (a,R) ⊂
⋂
F∈I
Nθ(F, a,R) ⊂ Da,R,
however it is clear that Da,R ⊂ Nθ(F, a,R) for every Maskin monotonic F .
Therefore M = I, contradiction.
7.2.2 SCR-DEPENDENT APPROACH
In this approach, we aim to find a function as before, but this time dependent
on the function also. This approach can be manipulated by defining T as
T (F ) = N (F ) if F ∈ I and T (F ) = N (F )c if F /∈ I, which would clearly
do the job. However, we aim to find a meaningful T , which is not defined in
terms of the implementability of F .
We take a shortcut, and do not consider the cases which are counterparts
of α, β, θ neutralities. Instead, we try to define a function also dependent on
the agents. But then, a troublesome problem occurs, namely how to define a
neutrality and how to apply it to a profile.
Definition. Given a ∈ F (R), a weak neutrality of (F, a,R) is an |N | tuple
of permutations σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σN) ∈ PN such that a ∈ F (σ1(R1), σ2(R2), ...,
σN(RN)). All weak neutralities of (F, a,R) is denoted by NW (F, a,R).
Definition. Given a ∈ F (R), a balanced neurality of (F, a,R) is an |N |
tuple of permutations σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σN) ∈ PN such that ∃i ∈ N with
σi(a) ∈ F (σ1(R1), σ2(R2), ..., σN(RN)). All balanced neutralities of (F, a,R)
is denoted by NB(F, a,R).
Weak neutrality surely is not in the spirit of neutrality since the alternative
in question is kept fixed. Balanced neutrality is a more appropriate approach,
however it turns out that the characterization in terms of balanced neutralities
is just an extension of the characterization in terms of weak neutralities. The
following definition seems the the best alternative at hand.
Definition. Given a ∈ F (R), a neutrality of (F, a,R) is an |N | tuple of
permutations σ = (σ1, σ2, .., σN) ∈ PN such that σi(a) = σj(a) ∀i, j ∈ N and
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σi(a) ∈ F (σ1(R1), σ2(R2), ..., σN(RN)). All neutralities of (F, a,R) is denoted
by N (F, a,R).
Recall the theorem by Danilov, stating that F is Nash-implementable if
and only if F is Danilov-monotonic. Danilov monotonicity is stated as:
a ∈ F (R), Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri)) ⊂ L(a,R′i) ∀i⇒ a ∈ F (R′).
Lemma 1. F is Danilov-monotonic (Nash-implementable) if and only if F
is h∗ monotonic where hFi (a,R) = L(x
F (a,Ri), Ri) and x
F (a,Ri) is the top
element of Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a} in Ri.
Proof. First part is trivial since Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a} ⊂ hFi (a,R).
For the converse, assume that F is h∗ monotonic. Note that since hFi (a,R) ⊂
L(a,Ri), F is Maskin monotonic. Now take any (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ). Let
R′ be such that Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri)) ⊂ L(a,R′i), ∀i ∈ N . Let R′′ be de-
rived from R so that hFi (a,R) is reordered by putting Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a}
to the bottom in some arbitrary order, and a gets down to the place just
above hFi (a,R), ∀i ∈ N . Since F is h∗ monotonic, still a ∈ F (R′′). No-
tice that Ess(F, a, L(a,R′′i ))\{a} ⊂ Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a} ∀i ∈ N. Then
hFi (a,R
′′) ⊂ Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a} since Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a} is grouped
at the bottom in R′′. Then consider the profile R′′′ derived from R′′ by mov-
ing a just above hFi (a,R
′′) ∀i ∈ N. By h∗ monotonicity, a ∈ F (R′′′). Now
it is clear that L(a,R′′′i ) = h
F
i (a,R
′′) ∪ {a} ⊂ Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri)) ⊂ L(a,R′i)
∀i. Then by Maskin monotonicity, a ∈ F (R′), implying that F is Danilov-
monotonic.
Definition. ΣW (F, a,R) =
∏
i∈N
{σ ∈ P : σ(hFi (a,R)) = hFi (a,R)}.
Definition. ΣB(F, a,R) = {σ ∈ ΣW (F, a,R) : there exists i ∈ N with
σi(a) = a}.
Theorem 3. F is Nash-implementable if and only if F is Maskin monotonic
and ΣW (F, a,R) ⊂ NW (F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ).
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Proof. Assume that F is Nash-implementable, i.e. Danilov-monotonic. Take
any (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ) and σ ∈ ΣW (F, a,R), let R′i = σi(Ri) ∀i ∈ N . Note that
a /∈ hFi (a,R). From definition we have aR′ihFi (a,R)⇒ aR′iEss(F, a, L(a,Ri))
∀i ∈ N. Then a ∈ F (R′) by Danilov-monotonicity. Therefore σ ∈ NW (F, a,R),
hence ΣW (F, a,R) ⊂ NW (F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ).
For the converse, assume that F is Maskin monotonic and ΣW (F, a,R) ⊂
NW (F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ). Take any (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ). Assume that R′
satisfies hFi (a,R) ⊂ L(a,R′i) ∀i. Take a permutation σ′ ∈ PN such that
σ′i(h
F
i (a,R)) = h
F
i (a,R) and σ
′
i(A\hFi (a,R)) is ordered as in R′i, ∀i. It is
clear that σ′ ∈ ΣW (F, a,R) ⊂ NW (F, a,R), hence a ∈ F (R′′), where R′′ =
(σ′1(R1), σ
′
2(R2), ..., σ
′
N(RN)). But note that L(a,R
′
i) = L(a,R
′′
i ) ∀i. Then
by Maskin monotonicity of F, a ∈ F (R′), hence F is h∗ monotonic, hence
Nash-implementable by the lemma.
Theorem 4. F is Nash-implementable if and only if F is Maskin monotonic
and ΣB(F, a,R) ⊂ NB(F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ).
Proof. Assume that F is Nash-implementable, i.e. Danilov-monotonic. Take
any (R, a) ∈ Gr(F ) and σ ∈ ΣB(F, a,R), let R′i = σi(Ri) ∀i ∈ N . σ ∈
ΣB(F, a,R) ⊂ ΣW (F, a,R) ⊂ NW (F, a,R), hence a ∈ F (R′). Since σ ∈
ΣB(F, a,R), ∃j ∈ N with σj(a) = a, i.e. ∃j ∈ N with σj(a) ∈ F (R′). There-
fore σ ∈ NB(F, a,R), hence ΣB(F, a,R) ⊂ NB(F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ).
For the converse, assume that F is Maskin monotonic and ΣB(F, a,R) ⊂
NB(F, a,R), ∀(R, a) ∈ Gr(F ). Assume that R′ satisfies hFi (a,R) ⊂ L(a,R′i)
∀i. Let the alternative just above xF (a,Ri) in Ri be called yF (a,Ri). Take
σ′ ∈ PN such that [σ′1 = σ0] and ∀i 6= 1, [σ′i(hFi (a,R)) = hFi (a,R), σ′i(a) =
yF (a,Ri), σ
′
i(y
F (a,Ri)) = a, and other elements are kept fixed]. Now it is
clear that σ′ ∈ ΣB(F, a,R) ⊂ NB(F, a,R), hence ∃j ∈ N with σ′j(a) ∈ F (R′′),
where R′′ = (σ1(R1), σ2(R2), ..., σN(RN)). Notice that {σ′i(a) : i ∈ N} =
{a} ∪ {yF (a,Ri) : i 6= 1}. If it was the case that yF (a,Ri) ∈ F (R′′) and
a 6= yF (a,Ri) for some i 6= 1, then yF (a,Ri) would be an essential element
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other than a. However, yF (a,Ri) /∈ hFi (a,R) ⊃ Ess(F, a, L(a,Ri))\{a}.
Contradiction. Therefore a ∈ F (R′′). Now, similarly take σ′′ ∈ PN such
that [σ′′i = σ0 ∀i 6= 1] and [σ′′1(hF1 (a,R′′)) = hF1 (a,R′′), σ′′1(a) = yF (a,R′′1),
σ′′1(y
F (a,R′′1)) = a, and other elements are kept fixed]. Then we have σ
′′ ∈
ΣB(F, a,R
′′) ⊂ NB(F, a,R′′), hence ∃j ∈ N with σ′j(a) ∈ F (R′′′), where R′′′ =
(σ1(R
′′
1), σ2(R
′′
2), ..., σN(R
′′
N)). With the same argument we obtain a ∈ F (R′′′).
But then by Maskin monotonicity, a ∈ F (R′). Therefore, F is h∗ monotonic,
i.e. Nash-implementable.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION
Refined center makes it a lot easier to write down a specific SCR. Just by
writing down the critical profiles for each alternative, we may formally talk
of the SCR. Moreover, it should be noted that UT is independent of SCR in
question. It makes well possible to track down to all SCR’s that have T as a
center by following the steps. The result may lead to further research in the
sense that there may occur other common properties of the SCR’s that have
a common center. Moreover, by the fact that any subset of a center is also a
center, we may talk of largest centers. It would be interesting to find largest
centers, and investigate what other common properties the SCR’s with the
largest centers have. Finally in chapter 1, we have proved that the whole set
of preference profiles can never be a center. Therefore it is -always- possible
to find an SCR by using a proper subset of the set all profiles.
Concerning the self-monotonicity, we have proved that the set of self-
monotonicities of an SCR is a cartesian product of some sets associated with
each element of the graph of the SCR. The fact that it is a cartesian prod-
uct brings about the idea that there is a form of neutrality of subsets of
the alternatives in self-monotonicities. The main result of chapter 2 is that
there exists a lattice structure behind the monotonicities, and various self-
monotonicities could be derived from a monotonicity. The image of the func-
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tion f has some -chosen- number of elements, and that allows to partition
the self-monotonicities with respect to the number of (i, b) couples that the
self-monotonicity associates to a single profile in R(∗).
In chapter 3, if one would ask what are the most natural candidates that
preserve Maskin-Monotonicity, the most natural and also trivial answer would
be union, intersection, left operator, right operator, empty set, and a constant
set. It is interesting that the whole class of operations that preserve Maskin-
Monotonicity consists of exactly these operations but only differently applied
for each alternative. Moreover, these operations are closely related to semi-
group theory which brings about another research topic. Furthermore, if not
all but some of these operations are allowed, such as only union intersection
and left operator, these operations are transitive and there occurs a partial
order on the class of Maskin-Monotonic SCR’s. Hence we may talk of maximal
elements and equivalence classes.
The results concerning the impossibility and possibility domains are quite
interesting. It turns out that when we employ Manhattan metric, i.e. by
adding 1 for each transpositions, we miss out the information that the bound
n is indeed (n− 1) ∗ 1 + 1 and that last 1 is quite important than n− 1 1’s.
That last 1 corresponds to the transposition of second and third place. The
main of reason of the impossibility is switching second and third place even
after taking the least element in the social norm to top place. In order to get
rid of the impossibility, the domain should satisfy the consolation property,
namely the social center should be appeased by any individual that top ranks
the bottom of the norm, by putting the top alternative of the social norm
to the second place. Moreover, depending on the weights, it may become
well possible that there are more than one impossibility and possibility do-
mains, which are consecutively nested, particularly, there exists impossibility
domains which are subsets of some possibility domains. Therefore, depending
on the state of society and the domain, an limited increment in the freedom
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of the society may rule out the impossibility result, resulting in the feasibility
of a desired social choice rule.
Although we could not reach the results we aimed for in the last chap-
ter, the results are still telling about neutrality. First of all, SCR’s that
are Maskin-Monotonic and neutral with respect to transpositions, say trans-
positive, are still Nash-implementable. It seems that Maskin-Monotonicity
should also be modified in order to reach an original necessary and sufficient
condition in terms of neutrality. Otherwise, the best way at hand would be
just recasting Danilov’s work. Also, the examples with the upper partitions
tell us that some SCR’s which are Nash-implementable are not even neutral
between two alternatives. They behave each and every alternative differently
but they are still Nash-implementable. Of course that is the case when we do
not consider different permutations for different voters. Therefore, it seems
that Nash-implementability could be more related to rights of voters than the
rights of alternatives, consistent with the NVP approach.
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